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ON ENGAGING PHILOSOPHICALLY 
WITH INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS 
John Taber, University of New Mexico 
Abstract   
This essay considers why English-speaking scholars have been inclined to engage Indian philo-
sophical materials “philosophically,” as opposed to purely historically. That is to say, they have 
tended to ask questions about the philosophical significance and even validity of the theories they 
encounter in Indian philosophical writings, often approaching them critically in the way philo-
sophers assess contemporary philosophical ideas. I first attempt to explain how this phenomenon 
has come about. Then I attempt to justify the philosophical approach to the study of Indian philo-
sophical texts by showing how it complements, in various ways, the historical-philological study 
of these materials. 
What kind of methodology should one employ when studying the writings of the 
philosophers of classical India?  
The approach most scholars have taken up till now, especially continental Euro-
pean scholars, following in the footsteps of the great pioneers of the study of 
Indian philosophy in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century, has been to 
view their writings as historical documents, as materials for the reconstruction of 
the intellectual history of India. I shall consider as my example in this essay the 
6th c. C.E. Buddhist philosopher DharmakƯrti. DharmakƯrti was a central figure in 
the history of Indian Buddhism; he shaped its teachings into a comprehensive, 
sophisticated, and powerful philosophical system that was immensely influential 
both in India, where its views provoked intense philosophical debates among 
  Previous versions of this essay were presented as talks at National Chengchi University, 
University of Vienna, University of Heidelberg, and University of New Mexico. Thanks to 
various scholars present on those occasions who gave helpful feedback, or who commented 
on earlier drafts, including: Kelly Becker, Mary Domski, Jay Garfield, Brent Kalar, Birgit 
Kellner, Chen-Kuo Lin, Axel Michaels, Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi, Parimal Patil, Isabelle 
Ratié, Ernst Steinkellner, and Iain Thomson. Some of the thoughts expressed in this essay 
grew out of exchanges with my good friend Vincent Eltschinger. 
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Buddhists and non-Buddhists that continued for centuries, then later in Tibet. 
Scholars have attempted, first and foremost, to understand his ideas and theories 
in their historical context, by identifying their philosophical sources and expli-
cating the theories of other philosophers or philosophical schools they engage. 
They have also traced further developments of his views by later adherents of his 
school, the so-called logico-epistemological school of Buddhist philosophy, as 
well as the responses to them crafted by his non-Buddhist (Brahmin and Jain) 
opponents.1 
This project has involved the editing and translating of his works and com-
mentaries on his works, and their critical re-editing and re-translation as new 
manuscript materials have become available. There have been some expository 
and interpretive studies, though it is generally acknowledged that until all of 
DharmakƯrti’s works have been critically edited and accurately translated, such 
studies can be considered only preliminary. More recently, there have been 
attempts to fill in the social and religious background of his thought. 
Scholars who have approached the study of DharmakƯrti in this way have 
tended to shy away, even deliberately refrain, from a philosophical engagement 
with his writings. By that I mean: reflecting on the broader philosophical mean-
ing of his ideas in light of similar and contrasting views of the things they treat – 
and not just in light of theories that were current in India in his day but even 
ones familiar to us only from Western philosophy (such as “nominalism” and 
“idealism”); analyzing his arguments and evaluating their strengths and weak-
nesses as philosophical arguments and assessing the overall plausibility of his 
system (Is it internally consistent? Does it present us with a compelling picture 
of reality?); and arriving at some judgment about how well his theories hold up 
under the sorts of criticisms that were levelled against them by his contem-
poraries and subsequent generations of thinkers (Who won the great debates that 
took place between Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers over DharmakƯrti’s 
views?). 
European scholars have tended to be more cautious about engaging in such 
reflections and asking such questions. Certainly, this has to do at least in part 
with the fact that the study of DharmakƯrti in Europe evolved within the 
1  It will be evident from my remarks that I am thinking primarily of the study of Indian 
philosophy in the German-speaking sphere (extended to the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, 
and parts of Switzerland). Isabelle Ratié has pointed out to me that the situation has been 
quite different in France, and I am sure this is true of other parts of Europe as well. My ob-
servations do not have to have universal application (to Europe) in order to draw the contrast 
I want to draw. 
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discipline of Indology, which, especially in Europe, is seen as a historical-philo-
logical science. Virtually all of the great European Indologists and Buddho-
logists of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century were trained as classical 
philologists; they applied the methods and standards of classical philology to the 
study of Indian texts. Although several prominent German philosophers during 
this same period worked hard to differentiate the Geisteswissenschaften from the 
Naturwissenschaften, and to justify the former as having their own distinctive 
methodology suited to achieving their own ends – in particular, Verstehen, “un-
derstanding,” as opposed to Erklärung, “explanation” – classical philologists 
have never been very keen about this distinction. For them, the natural sciences 
still serve as a paradigm, and they are suspicious of some other kind of “science” 
that promises its own special kind of knowledge. Indologists and Buddhologists 
trained in this classical philological tradition have tended to think that their 
discipline can be practiced with the same rigor, precision, and objectivity as the 
natural sciences, and that it can achieve the same sorts of results – explanations 
of developments in the history of Indian thought and literature that can compare 
with the explanations of natural phenomena in the physical sciences. 
Another factor that has contributed to some scholars adopting a more “ob-
jective,” scientific stance toward DharmakƯrti and other Buddhist philosophers is 
the fact that their thought appears to be based on certain religious presuppo-
sitions. They are concerned with things such as liberation from the cycle of 
rebirth, the attainment of “perfect, complete enlightenment,” the omniscience of 
the Buddha, and so forth – in short, with matters that transcend the human 
condition. A modern scholar cannot really be expected to “think along with” 
these philosophers, attempt to see the world from their point of view, if that 
requires assuming the reality of such things. One is also uncomfortable posing 
questions about the validity of philosophical theories that have such presuppo-
sitions, since questions such as whether there really is something like liberation 
from the cycle of rebirth (not to mention a cycle of rebirth itself!) seem, to us in 
our time, undecidable. Indeed, concerns of this sort have influenced the field of 
Religious Studies in the U.K. and the U.S., where scholars have increasingly 
employed the methodology of the social sciences when studying Indian belief 
systems. 
Another factor contributing to preference for a historical-philological 
approach to DharmakƯrti that refrains from trying to comprehend and assess his 
views philosophically has no doubt simply been the incomplete state of our 
knowledge of his works. We are still putting the pieces of his system together; 
crucial parts of his corpus have not been critically edited, let alone translated and 
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studied. The whole has yet to come completely into focus. How, then, could one 
presume to pronounce judgment on the overall significance and validity of his 
system, or even of a part of it – a particular theory, such as the apoha theory of 
meaning? And this is true of most, if not all, other Indian philosophers of the 
classical period.2 
Nevertheless, despite all these good reasons for standing back from a figure 
like DharmakƯrti and treating him as a historical phenomenon, scholars in the 
English-speaking West (the U.K., U.S., Australia-New Zealand, and Canada) – 
at least, outside the field of Religious Studies – have been much more inclined to 
engage philosophically with figures of the history of Indian philosophy such as 
DharmakƯrti. (Perhaps, however, the Indian philosophers with whom scholars 
have most often attempted to engage philosophically have been ĝaৄkara and 
NƗgƗrjuna; more recently, CandrakƯrti, KumƗrila, ĝƗntarakৢita, and ĝƗntideva 
have received considerable philosophical attention.) I have in mind scholars such 
as Karl Potter, B. K. Matilal, J. N. Mohanty, Arindam Chakrabarti, Bina Gupta, 
Mark Siderits, Roy Perrett, Jay Garfield, Stephen Phillips, Jonardon Ganeri, 
George Dreyfus, Tom Tillemans, and Dan Arnold. And there is now an emerg-
ing generation of excellent younger scholars approaching Indian philosophy 
from the standpoint of analytic philosophy. 
In this essay I, first of all, want to try to explain why this is the case, that is, 
why there appears to be a basic difference in orientation toward Indian philo-
sophy on the part of European and English-speaking scholars. Here, I myself 
shall be offering something of a historical and sociological explanation for this 
phenomenon. Second, I want to demonstrate what I believe are the advantages 
and benefits of a “philosophical” approach. In doing so, I by no means intend to 
disparage what I shall refer to as the “scientific,” i.e. the historical and 
philological study of DharmakƯrti. There are certainly ways of viewing it that 
disparage it. One could depict it as a “totalizing” discourse which brings its 
object under the interpreter’s power by “objectifying” it, i.e. making it into a 
thing, etc., etc. There are some who have been inclined to view the entire field of 
Indology in this way, influenced by Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism. But 
that is not at all the direction I want to go in. On the contrary, I consider the dis-
closure of DharmakƯrti’s thought by historical and philological research to be 
2  Of course, we do not have anything like a complete and reliable corpus of Aristotle’s works. 
Many of his “works” do not represent continuous treatises that he intended to publish in the 
form that has come down to us; some of them may even be collections of notes or drafts 
edited by later redactors. This has not prevented us from having a rich philosophical en-
gagement with his thought. 
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one of the most important achievements in the humanities in the last fifty years. 
Rather, I wish to present the philosophically-engaged study of Indian philo-
sophy, of DharmakƯrti in particular, as a valuable complement to the scientific 
study of him, which not only reveals aspects of his thought that the latter cannot 
access but also perhaps assists it in certain ways.3 
1 
In order to understand why the Anglophone scholar of Indian philosophy 
practices his discipline in the way he does, one must understand the environment 
in which he or she works. Almost all of the scholars of Indian philosophy I have 
in mind were formally trained as philosophers and have held faculty positions in 
philosophy departments in the U.K. or U.S.4 Now, most English-speaking philo-
sophers believe that the twentieth century was one of philosophy’s golden ages. 
During the last century, philosophy was transformed by developments in various 
disciplines – logic, the foundations of mathematics, the history of science, com-
puter science and artificial intelligence, and cognitive science and neuroscience 
– which allowed for the reformulation and clarification of many traditional 
philosophical problems. New insights were achieved into problems that have 
been with us since ancient times. If they have not been solved, then at least we 
feel we understand them better; and new questions that appear to open up pro-
mising new avenues of investigation have been posed. In short, there is a general 
sense in Anglo-American philosophy that progress has been and continues to be 
made. Scholars outside the discipline are often surprised to hear this. 
3  A critique of the philological-historical approach, however, is implicit in the suggestion that 
it should be complemented by a philosophical approach, which I develop in section 2 of this 
paper. As Jay Garfield (personal communication) provocatively puts it: The project of inter-
preting philosophical texts “conceived as free from philosophical analysis is simply inco-
herent. You can’t study what you do not understand, and to understand a philosophical text 
is to do philosophy.” 
4  Dreyfus holds a joint appointment in Philosophy and Religion at Williams College; Dan 
Arnold teaches in the Philosophy of Religions program in the Chicago Divinity School. 
Only Tom Tillemans, Prof. Emer. of Oriental Languages and Civilizations at the University 
of Lausanne, to my knowledge has not held a permanent position in a philosophy program. 
He studied philosophy, however, as an undergraduate at University of British Columbia 
when Jonathan Bennett was teaching there, and continued taking philosophy courses as a 
graduate student at the Universities of Geneva and Lausanne. 
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A historian of philosophy working in such an environment – in which 
advances are being made in the various sub-fields of philosophy and there is an 
atmosphere of optimism about progress; in sort, in which philosophy remains a 
vital enterprise5 – is, first of all, outnumbered. In a given “analytic” philosophy 
department, for every historian – and normally at most two historical fields will 
be represented: ancient philosophy and modern philosophy; positions devoted to 
medieval philosophy and nineteenth-century philosophy are considered luxuries 
– there are four or five philosophers working in the various systematic areas: 
metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, philosophy of science, social and political 
philosophy, and logic. Historians are under considerable pressure to keep abreast 
of developments in these other areas in order to stay in touch with and be able to 
talk to their colleagues. Moreover, they are often under pressure, no doubt to 
some extent self-imposed, to justify their pursuit of the history of philosophy by 
showing how it relates to what is going on in contemporary philosophy. This 
often manifests itself in an apologetic attitude on the part of historians. There is 
now a whole literature devoted to the question of the value of the history of phi-
losophy for philosophy. A recent volume on this topic contains essays with titles 
such as: “Is the History of Philosophy Good for Philosophy?,” “The History of 
Philosophy as Philosophy,” “What is Philosophical about the History of 
Philosophy?” (SORELL / ROGERS, 2005).6 Yet it would also not be inaccurate to 
say that some philosophers working in areas of analytic philosophy still wonder 
why there are historians in their departments.7 It is not unheard for someone 
working in analytic philosophy to refer to himself as “doing philosophy” and to 
his historian colleagues – with whom he will be on quite friendly terms – as “do-
ing scholarship.” Finally, it is not unheard for a philosophy department that in-
cludes specialists in analytic philosophy and historians to split into two separate 
departments, say, a philosophy department and a history of science department. 
The positive side of American historians of philosophy being trained and 
teaching in philosophy departments alongside colleagues who are (one hopes) 
doing cutting-edge work in contemporary philosophy, is that they tend to see the 
philosophical problems discussed in the texts they study as living problems. 
5  Much of this has to do, of course, with the fact that the sheer number of professional philo-
sophers today is so much greater than at any time in the past. 
6  See also RORTY / SCHNEEWIND / SKINNER, 1984; HARE, 1984; and LAVINE / TEJERA, 1989. 
HATFIELD, 2005 contains a useful survey of this literature with an extensive bibliography. 
7  The prominent Princeton analytic philosopher Gilbert Harman once put a sign on his door 
that said, “History of Philosophy: Just Say No!” SORELL, 2005: 43–44 explains why Harman 
was not being quite as dismissive of history of philosophy as it seems. 
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They are aware that they raise questions that are still being investigated today, in 
different forms (though some contemporary philosophers would dispute this). 
And they often justify their work on historical figures by claiming that they can 
still provide insights into the problems we are now working on. Indeed, histo-
rical texts present us with “landmark passages” in which philosophical questions 
are posed for the first time. These first formulations can be clearer, more direct – 
“purer,” if you will – than their articulations in contemporary literature (which 
are often overlaid with qualifications intended to head off objections and criti-
cisms, and which can also be very technical). More importantly, perhaps, these 
landmark passages were composed by geniuses; their content seems inexhaust-
ible. By going back to the source of a problem, to its original statement in the 
magnum opus of some great philosopher of the past, even a contemporary philo-
sopher immersed in the discussion of the modern iteration of the problem may 
notice an aspect of it he missed or had simply forgotten. At least, this is what 
historians of philosophy would like to think!8 
A historian of philosophy trained in the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land, or the U.K., moreover, seeing the problems addressed by the figure he is 
working on as problems he and his colleagues are still concerned with, is more 
inclined I think – I realize this is a perilous generalization – to adopt a critical 
stance toward them. The Anglophone historian of philosophy has been en-
couraged in his training as a philosopher to think independently and originally 
about philosophical questions; he/she sees historical figures not as authorities 
but as interlocutors. I believe this tendency especially contrasts with the attitude 
of European, especially continental, historians of philosophy. I do not want to 
fall back on stereotypes or make invidious comparisons, but I have studied 
philosophy both in Europe and the U.S. and I have always sensed that there is a 
fundamental difference in this respect. A teacher of mine when I was an under-
graduate at the University of Kansas, who had earned his doctorate in Germany 
and who after a long, tortuous journey finally ended up teaching philosophy at a 
large public university in the American Midwest, was always taken aback when 
8  Wilfrid Sellars stands out as a leading analytic philosopher who was also steeped in the 
history of philosophy. He wrote essays and books on historical figures (especially Kant) 
throughout his career. In the preface to a collection of his essays he writes, “For the juxta-
position of historical and systematic studies I make no apology. [...] I cannot conceive that 
my views on such topics as abstract entities, mental acts, induction, and the relation between 
theoretical and practical reasoning would have taken the form they have, if they had taken 
form at all, if I had not devoted as much time and energy to teaching and research in the 
history of philosophy as I did to these topics an sich betrachtet.” (SELLARS, 1974: vii.) 
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I and my fellow philosophy majors would “refute” Kant or Aristotle or Plato or 
Descartes simply by pointing out this or that “fallacy” in their writings. “Who 
am I to criticize these great minds?,” he would say. “I can only hope to under-
stand them!” 
Finally, the English-speaking historian of philosophy, working in a philo-
sophically dynamic environment, is less likely to be affected by what one might 
call the disillusionment with, or loss of faith in, philosophy that infected other 
humanistic disciplines toward the end of the twentieth century. This is the view 
that philosophy is finished, obsolete, has exhausted itself. Not only do we realize 
now that God is dead, we have also come to recognize that philosophy cannot 
provide us with definitive answers to metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical 
questions. Various factors have contributed to the emergence of this view, 
including developments within philosophy itself. In the middle of the twentieth 
century the field of philosophy was confronted with the challenge of the logical 
positivists that the statements of metaphysics are meaningless, and with the 
challenge of Wittgenstein that philosophical problems are really pseudo-
problems that arise when “language goes on a holiday.” Meanwhile, the very 
idea of objective truth has been called into question in the continental and 
American pragmatist traditions (Derrida, Rorty, etc.). That is to say, there is no 
“transcendent” or “objective” truth valid for everyone, independent of the 
inquirer’s perspective and discoverable through philosophical or even scientific 
investigation; there is no “God’s eye view” of things, as it is sometimes put. But 
the analytic tradition has by and large overcome these challenges. Logical posi-
tivism was defeated by a devastating critique of the verificationist theory of 
meaning (Carl Hempel) and the definitive rejection of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction (Quine). Wittgenstein’s views on language stimulated the emergence 
of a new and immensely fruitful sub-discipline of philosophy, the philosophy of 
language, which transformed metaphysics and epistemology and by no means 
eliminated them. And the repudiation of objective truth is seen, by analytical 
philosophers at least, as logically incoherent. It is simply warmed-over rela-
tivism, which Plato supposedly refuted 2500 years ago. It is mainly scholars in 
other humanistic disciplines – literary theory, cultural studies, rhetoric, and 
religious studies – to whom the results of technical analytic philosophy are in-
accessible, who have been impressed with these kinds of criticisms and tend to 
make statements to the effect that philosophy has exhausted its possibilities.9 
9  For a recent example see (last visited: February 18 2013) 
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/does-philosophy-matter/>. 
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All of these things, then – the continuing vigour of the analytic tradition of 
philosophy, the training of English-speaking historians of philosophy as philo-
sophers themselves, and the lack of disillusionment about philosophy and the 
continuing inclination to take philosophical problems seriously – support, I be-
lieve, a tendency to engage philosophically with historical texts among English-
speaking historians of philosophy, including historians of Indian philosophy. 
To be sure, there are English-speaking historians of philosophy who prac-
tice their craft in the “scientific” European fashion, just as there are European 
historians of philosophy who are informed and influenced by analytic philo-
sophy. In the U.S. I have in mind scholars such as Paul Guyer, Karl Ameriks, 
Daniel Garber, Catherine Wilson, Donald Rutherford, Edwin Curley, and Ste-
phen Gaukroger, among many, many others. There is a perception in some quar-
ters that there is a renewed interest in this type of history of philosophy, once 
again, the kind that pays greater attention to the broader intellectual, social, and 
cultural context in which philosophers conceived their theories, which Gary 
Hatfield calls “contextual” history of philosophy (HATFIELD, 2005). Yet most 
historians still believe they are doing philosophy, not just history. There are ex-
ceptions, but I think it is significant that they still adopt a rather defensive 
stance.10 At the same time, there are also historians who are not at all defensive 
or apologetic about doing history of philosophy. The main reason for studying 
the history of philosophy, they would say, is so that we are not constantly re-
10  Daniel Garber, a Descartes scholar, refers to the type of research he does, rather self-depre-
catingly I believe, as “antiquarian history of philosophy.” He writes, “What [...] can the his-
torian of philosophy say to the analytic philosopher? Don’t study the history of philosophy 
with the idea that it will help you solve a particular problem that interests you. It probably 
won’t. But if a good philosopher is one who is reflective about his practice and his 
discipline, then a good philosopher is one who understands the larger historical context of 
what he is doing. In this way, the history of philosophy should be part of everyone’s philo-
sophical education, even that of the analytic philosophers who think they need it least. That 
is not why I, as antiquarian, pursue the kinds of studies that I do. I do them simply because I 
find them fascinating. But the larger perspective is something I am happy to offer my col-
leagues and their students.” (GARBER, 2005: 145–146.)  
What this statement reflects is that analytic philosophy is still the gold standard in the 
discipline of philosophy in the U.S. If you’re not doing it, or doing something that can 
somehow be seen as contributing to it – if you are really seriously doing the history of philo-
sophy – then you must either marginalize yourself, as Garber seems to have done, or you 
will be marginalized by your colleagues! 
134 JOHN TABER 
AS/EA LXVII•1•2013, S. 125–163 
inventing the wheel.11 Obviously, there are many approaches Anglophone scho-
lars take to the history of philosophy, and I have simplified matters considerably 
in order to make my point. 
Now, the scientific historian of philosophy might object to what I have 
been saying thus far as follows. Does not a philosopher who wants to “engage 
philosophically” with a historical figure at least have to be able to read his works 
in the original? Does not he/she have to interpret them accurately, which re-
quires understanding them in their historical context? And does not that involve 
the recovery and restoration of the philosopher’s works through the collation and 
study of manuscripts and the publishing of critical editions? How can we pre-
sume to know what a philosopher said except from his words? And how can we 
presume to understand the meaning of his words without reconstructing – by 
carefully examining all of his critically edited works, as well as the works of his 
immediate predecessors and contemporaries, commentaries on his works, and so 
on – what the words he used must have meant to him. In short, should not phi-
losophical engagement with a philosopher of the past, even if it somehow com-
plements purely historical research, be grounded on and preceded by historical-
philological scholarship? 
I believe the answer to this question is: it depends on the quality of the phi-
losophy on offer. A truly first-rate philosophical discussion of a problem or set 
of problems found in a historical text, or even problems not really in the text but 
merely suggested by it, can compensate for a more “relaxed” style of scholar-
ship. Classic examples are Bertrand Russell’s book on Leibniz, P. F. Strawson’s 
book on Kant, and Bernard Williams’ book on Descartes.12 These writers – but 
may we not call them scholars, too? – admit that they are not chiefly concerned 
with historical accuracy: what the philosophers they are studying actually inten-
ded, or what their works meant in their historical context. They are concerned, 
rather, with systems of ideas or specific theories they believe they find, ex-
pressed more or less adequately, in their works. Their primary interest in those 
ideas and theories is whether they are true. In discussing them, they may even do 
11  Henry Allison, the noted Kant scholar, is a good example of this attitude. He writes, e.g. in 
the introduction to his work on Kant’s transcendental idealism: “Unlike most writers on 
Kant, I take much of the Critique [of Pure Reason] to be not only ‘interesting’ or to ‘contain 
more of value than is sometimes supposed,’ but to be philosophically defensible. At the very 
least, I believe that with a bit of help from the sympathetic interpreter it can be defended 
against many of the familiar criticisms that are repeatedly presented as ‘devastating’.” 
(ALLISON, 1983: 3.) 
12  Though I think the last has considerable scholarly merit as well. 
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violence to the texts themselves, attempting to “fix them up” (HATFIELD, 2005: 
90, 94–97) so that they convey the positions they see in them more forcefully. 
They may reformulate statements to make them more consistent or rigorous; 
ignore or dismiss passages they believe detract from, or create confusion about, 
the ideas and theories they think their philosophers are trying to work out. The 
works such “philosophical” historians produce may in the end tell us more about 
their own views than those of the philosophers they are writing about. Yet the 
depth of their reflection, if it really does originate in and is honestly inspired by 
the thoughts of their subjects, can often yield considerable insight into what the 
latter really meant. 
But how is that possible?, the scientific historian might persist in asking. 
How can one know what ideas are being expressed by a text if one is not guided 
by the letter of the text? Surely, our only clue to an author’s intention – or, if you 
prefer, the meaning of a text (if you want to leave the author out of it) – are his 
or its actual words (HACKER, 1965). 
The answer to this question is itself a philosophical one: any meaningful 
discourse, or any statement, is about some object which itself is not reducible to 
the words of the text. A medical treatise may be concerned with, say, digestive 
disorders. It offers certain descriptions and explanations of a variety of ailments 
and prescribes treatments for them. In order to comprehend what the treatise is 
saying about these ailments one must, obviously, be acquainted with them to 
some extent independently (though, it is hoped, not by having them!); one has to 
know the things the text is describing and theorizing about. Our knowledge of 
those things, of the phenomena the text is referring to, together with our know-
ledge of the language and concepts employed in the text itself, guide our inter-
pretation; our interpretation is the product of our knowledge of the meanings of 
the words themselves as they are employed in the text and our knowledge of the 
phenomena they describe and analyze. This is also true of philosophical texts. A 
philosophical treatise articulates a certain theory or position, which occupies a 
place on a scale or in a matrix of possible positions one can take on a certain 
problem – a certain position in “logical space.” 
Consider DharmakƯrti’s theory of apoha. It is a theory about the meaning of 
general terms that occupies a certain position on a spectrum of possible theories 
of general terms. The apoha theory belongs to a type that is not unfamiliar to 
Western philosophers; it is similar to (nominalist-)constructivist proposals about 
general terms proposed by European philosophers in the early modern period 
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(Spinoza, Locke, Hume), to replace Aristotle’s doctrine of substantial forms.13 
As such, it is an object that exists independently of DharmakƯrti’s writings, 
which they are addressing.14 
Similarly, DharmakƯrti’s anti-realism (or idealism, if you prefer) is a pro-
posal that occupies a certain place on a continuum of possible anti-realist posi-
tions. As such, it is an object DharmakƯrti is writing about and separable from 
what he says. Now, a good philosopher – by that I mean a philosopher who is 
conversant with a broad range of philosophical theories and adept at analyzing 
and critiquing them, who moreover knows what it is to come up with a defens-
ible solution to a philosophical problem – can pick up a text of the history of 
philosophy and, with very little to go by, perhaps even unable to read the text in 
its original language, recognize which position in the matrix of possible posi-
tions on a certain problem it is addressing – even if, paradoxically, it is one 
he/she has never encountered before.15 And he can then proceed to reflect on it 
independently of the text, exploring its assumptions, its implications, and its 
strengths and weaknesses as a philosophical position on the problem in question. 
It is such a philosopher’s insight into the inner logic of the position adopted by 
the figure in question that can sometimes be of use to the scientific historian. By 
addressing himself to the type of theory behind the text or addressed by the text 
– this may sound very Platonic or Fregean, but I do not think there is any other 
more plausible view – by examining its consistency, plausibility, and ramifica-
tions as a set of ideas, the philosopher may bring out aspects of the thought of a 
historical figure that the scientific historian, working more closely with original 
source materials, has overlooked.16 
13  SPINOZA, 1982: 87–90 (Ethics II, Props. 37–40, esp. scholium 1 ad Prop. 40); LOCKE, 1995: 
326–335 (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chap. 3). 
14  When the apohavƗda is compared with these European proposals, it becomes even more 
pressing to explain why the Buddhists adopted a “double negation” strategy (where one of 
the negations is term negation and the second is sentential negation) to stress that general 
terms do not refer to anything real and universals are only figments of our imagination. 
European philosophers were able to convey a sense of the imaginary nature of universals 
without resorting to any notion of exclusion. 
15  Compare a jeweller who has seen many, many kinds of gem. He picks up a type of gem he 
has never seen before and recognizes it as a new type, which relates to the other types of 
gems he is already acquainted with in certain ways. 
16  Thus, RUSSELL, 1937: xii: “Where we are inquiring into the opinions of a truly eminent 
philosopher, it is probable that these opinions will form, in the main, a closely connected 
system, and that, by learning to understand them, we shall ourselves acquire knowledge of 
important philosophical truths. And since the philosophies of the past belong to one or other 
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Let me be clear, however: this is not the approach I prefer. For one thing, I 
lack the philosophical ability of a Strawson or a Russell or a Williams – or even 
a Mark Siderits or a Jonardon Ganeri! For another, over the years I have come to 
mistrust my first impressions of what Indian philosophers are saying. Invariably, 
I find, as I continue to work more closely with the texts, that it turns out to be 
something quite different from what I initially thought and – this is key – some-
thing better. It is often an altogether new way of looking at a problem that would 
never have occurred to me, which also seems quite defensible; at the very least, 
it has something to recommend it. When one has had this experience over and 
over, one becomes much more concerned with the actual words of the author 
one is studying and their precise meaning in the corpus of his writings and texts 
of the same period. I myself have come to believe that the single most important 
task today in DharmakƯrti studies is to produce a critical edition and translation 
of the PramƗ۬avƗrttika. That is why I travel to Europe when I can, to learn the 
skills of editing and translating texts, or at least to collaborate with other scho-
lars who are more proficient in those practices than I. 
But can one even edit and translate a philosophical text without reflecting 
on it philosophically? I take up this question in the next section. 
2 
Even at the most basic level of the philological processing of a text, the com-
piling of a critical edition, a rudimentary understanding of the argument being 
presented in the text is crucial. A necessary condition, it would seem, for se-
lecting a reading from among different variants is that it should assist, or at least 
not interfere with, one’s ability to make sense of the text. The passage one is 
editing does not have to be cogent or convincing, but it cannot be gibberish. As 
Erich Frauwallner wrote in 1957, in his review of RƗhula SƗnk৚tyƗyana’s 1953 
editio princeps of the PramƗ۬avƗrttika with PrajñƗkaragupta’s commentary, 
“[Philosophical texts] cannot be edited in a satisfactory way as long as the phi-
________________________________ 
of a few great types – types which in our own day are perpetually recurring – we may learn, 
from examining the greatest representative of any type, what are the grounds for such a 
philosophy. We may even learn, by observing the contradictions and inconsistencies from 
which no system hitherto propounded is free, what are the fundamental objections to the 
type in question, and how those objections are to be avoided.” 
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losophical situation of their time is not adequately understood.” Yet the philoso-
phical situation can be understood only on the basis of published texts; therefore, 
one should not expect first editions to be free from faults. Nevertheless, he takes 
SƗৄk৚tyƗyana to task for “many mistakes which might easily have been avoided” 
if he had simply understood what the text is discussing. Examining SƗৄk৚tyƗ-
yana’s edition of a verse in the fourth chapter of the PramƗ۬avƗrttika where, 
apparently unbeknownst to SƗৄk৚tyƗyana, DharmakƯrti is explaining DignƗga’s 
definition of the pak܈a, he writes, “R. S. cannot have grasped the meaning of the 
sentence, else he would not have written such nonsense” (FRAUWALLNER, 1957: 
59). Let that suffice as a reminder that meaning, obviously, comes into conside-
ration even when editing a text. If one is editing a philosophical text the meaning 
should, ideally, be a coherent philosophical thought. 
It does not require specialized philosophical training to be able to do this. 
Most historians who work on Indian philosophical texts develop this ability. 
Nevertheless, it is a philosophical skill. 
Of course, when it comes to translating a philosophical text, grasping the 
meaning becomes even more important. A philosophical text, by its very nature, 
aims to demonstrate something. Many Sanskrit philosophical texts have the 
word siddhi, “proof” or “demonstration,” in the title: the proof of momentari-
ness, the proof of a self, the proof of apoha, of the existence of God, of the 
existence of other “[mental] series,” i.e. other minds, etc. A translation of a 
philosophical text should ideally make it possible to follow the argument of the 
text, the proof of whatever it is proving – and not just in its general outline, but 
every twist and turn. Now some annotated translations succeed in doing this. But 
the author of an annotated translation always has a choice whether to explain 
something or not, and in the best annotated translations of Sanskrit philosophical 
texts these days it is philological questions that receive the most attention. The 
philosophical meaning, the argument, tends to be neglected. I stress that this is 
not always the case; moreover, it is essential that philological questions be dis-
cussed thoroughly; finally, sometimes the philosophical meaning of a text is 
rather elusive, and one can only explain what one can. Nevertheless, insufficient 
attention paid to the argument of a text is the reason why when philosophers 
who are not specialists in Indian philosophy pick up a translation of a work of 
Indian philosophy, they often just scratch their heads. They cannot even figure 
out, from the translation, what it is about. 
I believe it is the responsibility of a translator of any philosophical text, 
Indian or Western, to do everything in his/her power to make its argument clear 
– that means, to explain it without remainder – by whatever method one chooses 
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(notes, a commentary, a synopsis, etc.). A proof consists of a sequence of steps, 
each one of which is essential for the conclusion to follow. If one of the steps is 
missing or obscure, the proof does not work. And it does require a certain 
philosophical sensibility, which most Indologists working on such materials 
naturally develop, to recognize when one has or has not succeeded in explaining 
an argument. Doing this is important, I believe, not because one has an obliga-
tion to make the text accessible to non-specialists. We are kidding ourselves if 
we think that contemporary philosophers will ever mine the works of Indian 
philosophy for insights that might solve contemporary philosophical problems; 
they have more than enough resources at their disposal from their own tradition. 
Rather, it is important because it is part of what is required to do full justice to 
the text. 
Philosophical considerations can come into play, however, even when it is 
a matter of translating a single word. Perhaps the two most famous sentences in 
DharmakƯrti’s entire corpus are contained in PV 2.1ac’: “A means of knowledge 
is a cognition that is reliable17. Reliability is the continuation of the causal 
efficacy of the object.”18 Here, DharmakƯrti specifies “reliability” as one of the 
criteria of a means of knowledge, and defines it as the continued experience of 
the causality of the object cognized, i.e. its capacity to have effects on other 
things. But what exactly does the “continuation of causal efficacy” (artha-
kriyƗsthiti) mean? How, in particular, can an object, which according to the 
Buddhist metaphysics that DharmakƯrti vigorously defended, exists only for a 
instant, continuously exercise a causal capacity? It would seem that this problem 
has caused scholars to flounder somewhat in offering rather different translations 
of this expression, while consensus has more or less been reached about how to 
translate the other technical terms in the passage (pramƗ۬a, avisaۨvƗdin, and 
arthakriyƗ by itself). Thus, we find in TILLEMANS, 1999: 6, “confirmation of 
practical activity”; in FRANCO, 1997: 54 (n. 21), “Non-belying [means] to stand 
firm in respect to purposeful action”; in ELTSCHINGER, 2010: 408, “compliance 
with [the object’s capacity] to perform a function”; in VAN BIJLERT, 1989: 125–
126, “constancy [on the part of the thing and the cognition of it] with respect to 
the production of a [useful] effect [by the real particular thing, svalak܈a۬a].” 
Van Bijlert’s translation is closest to the usual meaning of sthiti: “remaining,” 
“abiding,” “continued existence,” etc. Obviously, these translations vary so 
17  More literally, perhaps: non-belying or does not lead astray. 
18  pramƗ۬am avisaۨvƗdi jñƗnam, arthakriyƗsthitiۊ / avisaۨvƗdanam [...]. 
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widely because we have not yet understood the thought DharmakƯrti is trying to 
communicate. 
If we look a bit farther afield, however, toward a discussion later in the 
same chapter of the PramƗ۬avƗrttika, such an understanding begins to emerge. 
At PV 2.63–72 DharmakƯrti is considering whether a substratum (ƗĞraya) or a 
container (ƗdhƗra) – presumably in this context, a body, but he could also have 
in mind the Ɨtman – is necessary for the “continuation” or “continuity” of cog-
nition.19 The larger context is the defence of the possibility of rebirth, that is, the 
question whether consciousness is able to survive the destruction of the body. 
(DharmakƯrti must be able to maintain that it is possible in order to allow for the 
possibility of the Buddha purifying and perfecting himself by practicing 
compassion over many lifetimes to achieve the status of an omniscient being, a 
pramƗ۬a unto himself, at least in regard to dharma.) If a substratum is required 
for the continuation of cognition, and that substratum is the body, then obviously 
cognition stops with the destruction of the latter. Now clearly in this passage, 
when DharmakƯrti is considering “continuity” he is not talking about the conti-
nuation of the same cognition over time but the continuity of the cognition series 
(santati). To say that cognition is continuous is simply to say that it keeps re-
curring (even, perhaps, after death). But, then, the causal efficacy of an object 
could be continuous in the same sense: it would not be continuously bringing 
about the same effect but its causal power would be actualized intermittently, 
that is to say, it would recur. In the typical epistemic situation, its initial occur-
rence would be when the object produces a cognition of itself in the cognizer. As 
DharmakƯrti implies at PV 3.50, discussing the unreality of universals, the mi-
nimal efficacy of an object is the capacity to produce a cognition (which a 
universal lacks – therefore, it cannot be considered a real thing).20 The confirma-
tion of one’s initial cognition of the object, constituting the cognition’s reliabi-
lity, then, would be the effect the cognized object produces in one upon acting 
on one’s cognition and obtaining the object – the warmth of fire, the coolness of 
water, etc. That would indeed represent the “continuation” of the causal efficacy 
of the object. 
19  The passage is analyzed by FRANCO, 1997: 139–155 and translated with PrajñƗkaragupta’s 
commentary 296–321. 
20  jñƗnamƗtrƗrthakara۬e ‘py ayogyam ata eva tat / tadayogyatayƗrǌpaۨ tad dhy avastu܈u 
lak܈a۬am //. Manorathanandin comments on jñƗnamƗtrƗrthakara۬e ‘py ayogyam as follows: 
antyƗ hƯyaۨ bhƗvƗnƗm arthakriyƗ yad uta svajñƗnajananam. 
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This may not, in the end, be the correct understanding of what DharmakƯrti 
is saying at PV 2.1ac’,21 but some such understanding, a coherent philosophical 
idea behind the verse, has to be grasped if we are to translate it correctly. Trans-
lation presupposes interpretation.22 If it is a philosophical text one is translating, 
it will be a philosophical interpretation. 
A philosophical sensibility is still more important when it comes to under-
standing the overall significance of a text or the thought of a particular figure in 
its historical context. To understand the significance of a philosophical text in its 
historical context means to understand, among other things,23 the philosophical 
situation of the text: What was the state of thinking about a particular problem or 
set of problems that confronted the author of the text? Or, what stage of deve-
lopment had thought about the particular problem or set of problems that the 
author is concerned with reached? What was the prevailing view (or views) 
about the problem; how was it formulated; in what ways was that formulation 
flawed or inadequate? What kinds of objections were in fact being brought 
against it? What other, competing positions did the author have to contend with? 
Given the state of thought about the problem, those objections and those com-
peting positions, and given the nature of the problem itself that the author is 
grappling with, how does what he says amount to a “solution” of it? Because the 
history of philosophy requires one to think through these sorts of questions, it is 
considered by those who practice it to be not just a historical discipline, but also 
a philosophical one. It is through this process that real insights can be achieved 
into problems that are still alive in philosophy today. 
To make this more concrete, let us consider one of the more striking, yet at 
the same time puzzling, features of DharmakƯrti’s system, his anti-realism. Anti-
realism is the view that the empirical world, the world that presents itself to us in 
sense experience, even as understood in the natural sciences, is unreal – not 
21  One problem is whether a real entity (vastu) must exercise causal efficacy at every moment 
it exists or, as DharmakƯrti seems to suggest (PV 3.3), merely have the capacity to do so 
(arthakriyƗsamartha). In mentioning the “continuation” of the arthakriyƗ he could simply 
mean the continuation of the capacity for arthakriyƗ. One must also consider other possible 
meanings of sthiti. Sometimes DharmakƯrti uses it in the sense of “a fixed rule,” e.g. PV 
3.145. Sometimes he employs it in the sense of “separate existence” or “distinction,” which 
can have an epistemic connotation (e.g. possibly PVSV 117, 22). 
22  As interpretation presupposes translation! This is one of the many forms the hermeneutical 
circle takes. 
23  Again, “other things” would include: the social, political, religious, and broader intellectual/ 
cultural context of the text. 
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necessarily that it does not exist (as Berkeley maintained), but that it is at least 
different from how it appears. Anti-realism has a long history in Buddhism. One 
may trace it all the way to the Buddha himself, who taught that, despite appea-
rances, things are undergoing constant change, which teaching was later for-
mulated in Abhidharma philosophy as the doctrine of momentariness. In 
MahƗyƗna Buddhism, the anti-realist tendency of Buddhism is much more 
pronounced: all things – even momentarily existing entities – are said to be 
altogether empty of essence (niۊsvabhƗva, nirƗtma). NƗgƗrjuna, the founder of 
the Madhyamaka school, attempted to show this by carrying out a rigorous, 
unrelenting deconstruction of all the fundamental categories that (consciously or 
unconsciously) structure ordinary experience for us: causation, motion, sub-
stance, essence, being, etc. In the YogƗcƗra tradition, with which DharmakƯrti 
has important affinities, the world is said to exist only in consciousness or 
cognition. This anti-realist teaching established itself within MahƗyƗna as a 
strong alternative to Madhyamaka anti-realism. Now, the first really rigorous 
philosophical working out of this view, the consciousness or cognition-only 
doctrine (vijñaptimƗtratƗ), was attempted by Vasubandhu (400–480 C.E., ac-
cording to Frauwallner) in his ViۨĞikƗ. In that text he seems to be trying to 
prove the unreality of objects outside cognition, i.e. physical objects, in two 
ways. First, he suggests that sense experience is indistinguishable from a dream 
(an idea that goes back to earlier YogƗcƗra texts, e.g. the MahƗyƗnasa۪graha), 
and indeed we can explain all aspects of our experience as the effects of 
mechanisms within cognition itself, so that there is no reason to postulate exter-
nal objects.24 Second, he argues that there is no coherent account one can give of 
physical objects, whether one conceives of them as consisting of atoms or as 
“wholes,” that is, as unified substances. 
Now, when we come to DharmakƯrti (whose date is a matter of lively 
controversy today, but who probably lived sometime in the 6th century)25, we 
find that he takes neither of these approaches in developing his anti-realist po-
sition. First, instead of a deconstruction of physical objects as either collections 
of atoms or as wholes, he mounts a critique of the object or “domain” (vi܈aya) of 
perception, namely, the concrete particular or svalak܈a۬a, which in his system 
24  Indeed, one sometimes gets the impression when reading the ViۨĞikƗ that Vasubandhu is 
arguing purely negatively. That is to say, he is presenting an argument ex silentio: there are 
no external objects, because there is no pramƗ۬a that establishes them. The argument from 
“non-apprehension” (anupalabdhi) was widely employed in early Indian philosophy, espe-
cially in the NyƗya tradition, to prove nonexistence. 
25  See, most recently, KRASSER, 2012. 
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counts as that which “ultimately exists” (paramƗrthasat) in the conventional 
realm because it is capable of having effects on other things – it is causally effi-
cacious. In essence, he argues that, if one scrutinizes the svalak܈a۬a closely, at 
least as the extended thing that is presented to us in perception, one sees that it 
can be neither one thing nor many things, hence (since those are exhaustive 
alternatives) it cannot be real.26 
So – and this is one of the paradoxical aspects of his anti-realism – we 
arrive, implicitly at the idea that what “ultimately exists” (in the conventional 
realm) is not real.27 Clearly DharmakƯrti’s argument is related to Vasubandhu’s 
argument against sense-objects, yet in crucial respects it is quite different. Inter-
esting also is that it echoes the kinds of deconstructive arguments one finds in 
NƗgƗrjuna’s writings. Second, instead of trying to salvage Vasubandhu’s 
26  The heart of the argument is PV 3.208–211. DharmakƯrti is engaged with the VaiĞeৢika in 
this section of PV 3, and has just finished refuting the notion of a whole (avayavin) as the 
svalak܈a۬a, especially in such cases as a butterfly or a variegated cloth, which obviously are 
many things. (He does not employ Vasubandhu’s arguments to reject the possibility of a 
whole per se, though obviously he thought such a thing was absurd.) DharmakƯrti appears to 
hold that the svalak܈a۬a is a mere collection of atoms (thus, admitting the coherence of the 
notion of an atom as such, which Vasubandhu questions), and that it is indeed possible to 
apprehend many things at once. His opponent, however, turns the tables on him at PV 3.208: 
“If oneness is not possible with respect to objects that appear variegated [such as a butterfly 
or a multicolored cloth], then how is the cognition that appears variegated one?” (citrƗ-
vabhƗse܈v arthe܈u yady ekatvaۨ na yujyate / saiva tƗvat kathaۨ buddhir ekƗ citrƗvabhƗsinƯ 
//). DharmakƯrti has to admit that it cannot be one, nor can it be many. This leads him to ad-
mit, PV 3.211, “Therefore, neither in the case of objects nor the cognition is there the [true] 
appearance of something bulky/extended; for something of that nature is denied for a single 
thing. Nor is it possible for many things, either” (tasmƗn nƗrthe܈u na jñƗne sthǌlƗbhƗsas 
tadƗtmanaۊ / ekatra prati܈iddhatvƗd bahu܈v api na sambhavaۊ //), and this calls into 
question the very reality of both object and cognition. In the subsequent verses, PV 3.212–
219, DharmakƯrti draws out the anti-realist implications of this position using YogƗcƗra 
terminology. 
27  One must note, however, that, as if returning to his senses after a bout of temporary insanity 
in PV 3.212–219, DharmakƯrti seems to adopt a realist position in vv. 220ff. The cognition, 
at least, which presents an extended, variegated appearance indeed could be one thing (PV 
3.221); and the svalak܈a۬a as a collection (sañcita, PV 3.194) of atoms could indeed acquire 
a new capacity of being visible which those atoms do not have individually (PV 3.223–224). 
Thus, DharmakƯrti appears to be deviating from DignƗga’s position at ƖlambanaparƯk܈Ɨ 3–5 
that a mere collection of atoms (*sañcita) cannot be the Ɨlambana, which is also denied by 
Vasubandhu, ViূĞ. 13–14 (discussing the proposal of the “KaĞmƯra VaibhƗৢikas” that 
atoms that are collected, saۨhatƗۊ, but not touching each other, comprise the object). See in 
particular PV 3.224. 
144 JOHN TABER 
AS/EA LXVII•1•2013, S. 125–163 
“dreaming argument,” which at a certain point was couched as a formal infe-
rence, an anumƗna, but had come under withering attack in that form by Brah-
min and Buddhist authors alike,28 he devises the notorious sahopalambhaniyama 
argument, which turns on the idea that object and cognition must be non-diffe-
rent because one is never perceived without the other.29 It is this argument which 
became the focus of heated debate over the existence of an external world be-
tween (Buddhist) anti-realist and (non-Buddhist) realist philosophers in subse-
quent centuries. 
Now, I would maintain that in order to understand DharmakƯrti’s anti-
realism historically, one must see how it evolved out of the anti-realist views that 
were in place when he took it upon himself to start thinking about the problem of 
what is real and what is not. Perhaps the most important precursor to his position 
would have been Vasubandhu’s view as modified, apparently, by teachers who 
intervened between Vasubandhu and DharmakƯrti who I think were trying to 
dress it up, couch it in a more rigorous logical form, together with certain con-
siderations brought up by DignƗga (DharmakƯrti’s immediate precursor) in a 
brilliant short treatise of his on the “object-support” (Ɨlambana) of perceptual 
cognition, the ƖlambanaparƯk܈Ɨ. The historian must, in other words, see what 
was wrong with or inadequate about the received views that compelled Dhar-
makƯrti to introduce the innovations he did, and how those innovations contri-
buted to a stronger, less objectionable and more plausible argument for anti-
realism. And that, I would insist, is a philosophical task. There is never a com-
pletely seamless transition from the writings of a philosopher’s predecessors to 
his own; in the case of Indian philosophy of course many of those writings are 
missing. Even when the historical record is complete, however, there are still 
gaps or leaps – indeed, we hope there are, otherwise our author would not be 
saying anything really new. The historian must fill in the gaps, make sense of the 
succession of statements leading up to the statement of the author, by thinking 
28  See TABER, 1994 and 2010. The (re-)formulation of the argument I am referring to appears 
in KumƗrila as: “The cognition of a post, etc., is false because it is a cognition (pratya-
yatvƗt); for whatever is a cognition is seen to be false, like the cognition of a dream”; stam-
bhƗdipratyayo mithyƗ pratyayatvƗt tathƗ hi yaۊ / pratyayaۊ sa m܀܈Ɨ svapnƗdipratyayo 
yathƗ // (ĝV, NirƗlambanavƗda 23). Versions of this argument are discussed in various 
other Buddhist and Brahmin texts. It appears to be loosely based on the first verse of the 
ViۨĞikƗ. It was easy to show that it is fallacious. 
29  The sahopalambhaniyama argument is presented at PV 3.335, 388–390 and PVin. 1.54ab. 
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through the problem himself, as a philosopher, from the standpoint of that 
author.30 
What I have been talking about here has been referred to by some as 
“internal” history of philosophy. The best depiction of this approach that I know 
of is that of J. B. Schneewind, the American historian of early modern 
philosophy, which I quote here at some length: 
[...] We would like to understand the work of earlier thinkers as philosophers. On our own 
understanding of what philosophy is, it involves argument and the working out of the full 
logical implications of a principle or a position. So we want the historian of philosophy to 
explain earlier thinkers, and their conversations, in ways that bring out their philosophical 
aspects. We are not content if we are told simply that they came to hold certain views – 
never mind why – and that these views influenced later writers – never mind how. An 
important intellectual historian tells us, for example, that the Enlightenment was “always 
moving from a system of the universe in which all the important decisions were made 
outside of man to a system where it became the responsibility of man to care for them 
himself.” This may be true. Indeed I think it is. But I do not understand it philosophically 
until I can see what rational steps led various thinkers from the earlier “system” to the later 
one. And to see this is to have an internal explanation of the change. 
More generally I think that the most satisfying account possible of why someone believes 
something is one which shows that what is believed either is true or is the proper outcome of 
a compelling argument from premises the person accepts, and that the person was in a good 
position to notice this. We may need to appeal to external factors to explain why the thinker 
was in a position to notice a truth or to see previously unnoticed implications of some of his 
beliefs. But we feel – surely correctly – that the fact that someone noticed the truth of some 
proposition or saw the soundness of an argument from his own beliefs to a new conclusion 
must be a strong explanation of why the person came to believe what he did. If such an 
explanation is available and correct, it seems to make unnecessary any search for further, 
non-rational, accounts of why the person held the belief. It seems then that it is only where 
30  Kurt Flasch, a leading European historiographer of philosophy, explains what the historian 
must understand as follows: “Der Begriff ‘historische Relativität’ ist zu präzisieren [...]. Im 
Zusammenhang geschichtlicher Selbstbesinnung kann er bedeuten: Theoretiker, Künstler 
und Handelnde arbeiten, oft über längere Zeitspannen hinweg, die Implikationen der für 
diese Zeit grundlegenden Philosophien durch oder entwickeln die in ihnen angelegten 
Gegensätze. Sie machen deren Prämissen, Konsequenzen und Widersprüche deutlicher. Sie 
konfrontieren sie mit neuen Erfahrungen und verändern sie entsprechend; sie finden deren 
Begründungen unzureichend und machen neue Entwürfe” (FLASCH, 2005: 85). And he de-
picts the process of “historical philosophizing” in this way: “Historisches Philosophieren 
besteht nicht darin, dass man ‘geschichtliche Umstände’ oder Veranlassungen philosophi-
schen Texten vorspannt oder nachsetzt, sondern im mitdenkenden Vollzug von Theoremen, 
die als solche mitvollzogen werden müssen, um in ihrem internen Zeitcharakter erfasst zu 
werden” (Flasch 2005: 88). 
146 JOHN TABER 
AS/EA LXVII•1•2013, S. 125–163 
internal explanations of the history of thought cannot be found that we must turn to external 
explanations; and if this is so, then it is evident why we should begin our work by seeking 
internal accounts. (SCHNEEWIND, 1984: 174–175.) 
I shall not comment further on this statement; it speaks forcefully for itself.31 I 
note, however, that Schneewind’s remark regarding when “external factors” 
should be taken into consideration in the history of philosophy is pertinent to a 
new approach that is being explored in the study of Buddhist epistemology. In a 
striking and erudite article, Vincent Eltschinger (ELTSCHINGER, forthcoming) 
argues that the internal development of Indian philosophy cannot explain “the 
sudden outburst of philosophical confrontation” among the different traditions 
that occurred around the beginning of the 6th century. Prior to that time, though 
there are stories of public debates between Buddhist and Brahmin philosophers 
and a science of dialectic had evolved in both traditions, we have only a few 
examples of texts in which the views of the other side are pointedly attacked. 
Therefore, it seems, we are compelled to search for other causes of this phe-
nomenon, and Eltschinger has in this connection drawn attention to an increased 
Brahminical hostility toward the Buddhists, as reflected in, among other things, 
PurƗnic prophesies that blame heretics for the decline of dharma in the kaliyuga. 
This heresiological apocalypticism, if you will (my phrase, combining two 
expressions Eltschinger uses separately), could have been one of several factors 
that put the Buddhists on the defensive, so to speak – there certainly had to be 
other political ones as well – and served as part of the background for the 
emergence of a range of innovations in Buddhism that we begin to notice toward 
the end of the fifth century: 
the foundation of [...] mahƗvihƗras or vihƗrama۬ڲalas ‘mimicking feudally grounded fort-
resses,’ the nearly contemporaneous rise of Buddhist Tantrism and epistemology, the strong 
decline of Abhidharmic creativity and [intra-Buddhist] controversy, etc. (ELTSCHINGER, 
forthcoming: 24). 
31  One might, however, object at this point along the following lines. The standards of 
rationality we would apply today in making judgments about “the rational steps” that led 
from one stage of thinking about a problem to another are historically determined, therefore 
certainly different from those that prevailed in DharmakƯrti’s time. There is no such thing as 
a universal perspective from which one might understand the evolution of Indian philo-
sophical thought. The short answer to this objection is that, when we examine DharmakƯrti’s 
writings on logic, and other texts on logic from the classical period of Indian philosophy, it 
becomes abundantly evident that the rules of correct reasoning then were very close, if not 
identical, to those we follow today. 
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Whether an internal explanation for the sudden explosion of intense debate 
between Buddhist and Brahmin philosophers really cannot be provided – one 
could argue that preoccupation with the pramƗ۬as extends all the way back to 
early Madhyamaka in Buddhist philosophy, and that it was DignƗga’s procla-
mation that the Buddha himself is to be considered a pramƗ۬a, and his attendant, 
devastating critiques of the definitions of the pramƗ۬as of Brahmin philosophers 
as well as even his own reputed teacher, Vasubandhu, that started everything – 
nevertheless, Eltschinger’s resorting to external explanatory factors when he 
believes internal ones are unavailable or insufficient, is quite consistent with the 
practice of the internal history of philosophy as Schneewind presents it.32 A 
philosophical text, like any other text, Yves Charles Zarka reminds us, 
is produced at a moment in human history, in a particular society which is confronted by 
specific problems. It goes without saying that philosophical thoughts do not come into being 
in some kind of heaven of ideas which is indifferent to worldly events (ZARKA, 2005: 149). 
That is a dimension of its meaning, too, though not the entirety of its meaning.33 
32  Eltschinger of course is more cautious than to maintain that these social-cultural develop-
ments can explain particular positions or theories that were adopted by different philoso-
phers or schools, e.g. the apohavƗda. Again, in his words, “To be clear, my aim is certainly 
not to hold Gupta apocalyptic eschatology itself as responsible for the conspicuous heresio-
logical turn of the MƯmƗূsƗ during the sixth century, and even less as responsible for the 
striking new directions taken by Indian philosophy from this century on. Rather, my use of 
apocalyptic prophecies aims at showing the growth of a Brahmanical hostility that may, at 
least in part, explain why Brahmanical schools such as NyƗya and MƯmƗূsƗ turned their 
attention towards Buddhism, and why the Buddhist epistemologists changed their habits and 
the meaning of Buddhist philosophy radically during the sixth century” (ELTSCHINGER, 
forthcoming: 22); “[...] By looking closer at the evolution of the Brahmanical apocalyptic 
eschatology, I hope I have been able to uncover one part of the ideological background 
against which these philosophical shifts and many other things make sense” (ELTSCHINGER, 
forthcoming: 23). 
33  Once again, the more radical position of a philosopher’s approach to historical figures is 
neatly expressed by RUSSELL, 1937: xi–xii: “The history of philosophy is a study which 
proposes to itself two somewhat different objects, of which the first is mainly historical, 
while the second is mainly philosophical. From this cause it is apt to result that, where we 
look for history of philosophy, we find rather history and philosophy. Questions concerning 
the influence of the times or of other philosophers, concerning the growth of a philosopher’s 
system, and the causes which suggested his leading ideas – all these are truly historical: they 
require for their answer a considerable knowledge of the prevailing education, of the public 
to whom it was necessary to appeal, and of the scientific and political events of the period in 
question. But it may be doubted how far the topics dealt with in works where these elements 
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3 
The final benefit of engaging philosophically with Indian philosophical materials 
is even less tangible than the ones I have discussed so far but I believe it is the 
most important of all, and this is that it enables one to appreciate the philo-
sophical value of the texts one is studying. By “value” I mean, essentially, their 
plausibility, persuasiveness, or cogency as accounts of whatever it is they are 
concerned with. Do they offer any real insights into reality or the human con-
dition? Do they have anything to say to us? 
Now I think most scientific historians will say that this kind of considera-
tion really is completely irrelevant to what they are doing, that it is inappropriate 
for the historian to be concerned with such a thing. The historian, after all, is 
attempting to chart the course of human development, and it is through that that 
he or she reveals something important about human nature and the human condi-
tion. It really does not matter whether what humans believed in a particular 
period, in a certain civilization, was true or false; what matters are the circum-
stances that led them to adopt that belief, how it influenced their behaviour, and 
how it determined the subsequent course of their culture or civilization. That is 
how we arrive at an understanding of what makes humans tick. 
Granted all that, I still think that at certain junctures in our study of the 
thought systems of other cultures and even our own civilization in other histo-
rical periods the question naturally comes up: Is this all just a lot of nonsense, or 
is there something to it? It is, indeed, our humanity that prompts us to ask this 
question, for it is our nature to want to know solutions to the great problems of 
metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. (As Aristotle said: All humans desire to 
________________________________ 
predominate can be called properly philosophical. There is a tendency – which the so-called 
historical spirit has greatly increased – to pay so much attention to the relations of philo-
sophies that the philosophies themselves are neglected. Successive philosophies may be 
compared, as we compare successive forms of a pattern or design, with little or no regard to 
their meaning: an influence may be established by documentary evidence, or by identity of 
phrase, without any comprehension of the systems whose causal relations are under dis-
cussion. But there remains always a purely philosophical attitude towards previous philoso-
phers – an attitude in which, without regard to dates or influences, we seek simply to dis-
cover what are the great types of possible philosophies, and guide ourselves in the search by 
investigating the systems advocated by the great philosophers of the past.” 
It is of course the latter that Russell intends to pursue. One of the implications of this 
passage is that even the sort of “internal” history of philosophy scholars like Schneewind ad-
vocate would be considered history and not philosophy by Russell. 
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know, and to know these things especially! [if I may so paraphrase the first book 
of his Metaphysics].) Nothing is more unnatural than to suspend all concern with 
truth-claims when studying other cultures or historical periods, as the historical 
and social sciences typically demand of us. Indeed, we can manage to do so for a 
while, but in the end curiosity about the truth of the vision of reality and human 
existence of a particular society or ancient thinker gets the better of us: Is every-
thing really suffering? Is the empirical world really just an illusion? – unless, of 
course, as I suggested above, one has completely “grown out of” asking such 
questions or thinks they are just bunk. (But, as I have also said, most philoso-
phers have not grown out of them or think they are bunk!) If you doubt that this 
is our most humane response, just give a lecture to a general audience on Indian 
philosophy strictly from the standpoint of the history of ideas and see what kinds 
of questions you get from the audience during the discussion period! (“But how 
can the world be just an illusion?!”) 
There’s a statement, attributed to the Harvard philosopher Burton Dreben, 
that analytic philosophers like to quote when they are ridiculing the history of 
philosophy: “Garbage is garbage, but the history of garbage is scholarship.” 
Now, to be sure, those who quote this statement are often unaware of how inter-
esting garbage can be! Ethnologists have drawn fascinating and important infe-
rences from examining garbage heaps. But it does seem, when we are investi-
gating not only the material artifacts of a particular culture but also its thought 
system, that we want to know whether what we are looking at is garbage or 
something else. Is an established teaching fundamentally irrational? If so, that in 
itself requires some explanation. (How could such a teaching become estab-
lished?) Is the methodology a certain school of thought employs to establish its 
views fundamentally flawed? That, too, would require some explanation. Some 
scholars have maintained that NƗgƗrjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka 
school, extensively employed logical fallacies in deconstructing the categories of 
Abhidharma philosophy; his writings are just a tissue of bad arguments. It seems 
pretty important to determine whether indeed that is the case or not, and so there 
is a considerable literature on this topic. 
And so, even the most rigorous of historians invariably find themselves, in 
their more reflective moments (moments of weakness?), touching on questions 
of the values of the ideas found in the texts they study. 
I shall conclude this essay with an example of how this can occur. Here, I 
move away from DharmakƯrti into another area of Buddhist thought. I shall draw 
on the work of one of the greatest living Buddhologists, Prof. Lambert Schmit-
hausen. One of the areas in which Prof. Schmithausen has made pioneering 
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contributions is the history of Buddhist ethics. He has written several important 
studies of Buddhist attitudes toward nature, including even plants and inorganic 
nature. He has also published numerous studies of the evolution of key Buddhist 
ethical concepts such as non-violence and compassion.34 For my purposes I wish 
to focus on just one article that Prof. Schmithausen has written on the history of 
the idea of non-violence, ahiۨsƗ, in Buddhism and other Indian religious tradi-
tions, “A Note on the Origin of ahiۨsƗ,” published in 2000 in a Festschrift for 
the Japanese Indologist Minoru Hara. 
In this article Prof. Schmithausen identifies what initially appear to be two 
distinct kinds of motivation for advocating non-violence in early Buddhist, Jain, 
and Brahmanical writings. One is fear of retaliation. This is related to a variety 
of stories, going back to the Vedic BrƗhma৆as (e.g. the story of Bh৚gu in the 
ĝatapatha BrƗhma۬a), that tell of individuals who are punished for acts of vio-
lence, usually toward animals, by having violence inflicted on them by their vic-
tims in the next world, or by other animals – representatives of the victims, as it 
were – in this world.35 Such fear gave rise to “ritualistic” prohibitions against 
killing for the sake of avoiding its unfortunate consequences for oneself and, 
more interestingly, to recommendations of specific ritualistic procedures in the 
context of the Vedic sacrifice to conceal the fact that killing is actually taking 
place or otherwise neutralize its effects (for instance, the practice of slaughtering 
the sacrificial victim at a location removed from where the offerings are made). 
We can call this the “prudential” motivation for non-violence: it is a matter of 
prudence that one not commit violence, because it will sooner or later rebound 
on oneself. 
The other motivation for non-violence is, apparently, empathy. This is 
sometimes expressed in formulations of the Golden Rule, which are also found 
both in early Jain and Buddhist texts. For example: 
I for one want to live and not to die. I want happiness and dislike pain. Since I want to live, 
etc., it would not be agreeable or pleasant to me if somebody were to take my life. Again, 
for another person, too, it would be disagreeable and unpleasant if I were to take his life, 
since he [too] wants to live, etc. Precisely that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to me is 
disagreeable and unpleasant also to the other. How then could I inflict upon the other that 
which is disagreeable and unpleasant to myself? (Saۨyutta NikƗya V 353, 29ff.) 
34  Of course, this hardly does justice to the numerous and varied contributions Prof. Schmit-
hausen has made to Buddhist Studies and Indology. 
35  Here Prof. Schmithausen draws on SCHMIDT, 1968 and 1997. 
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We however (in contradistinction to other teachers who assert that all living beings may be 
[…] killed) declare thus [...] “All living beings [...] should not be struck, not be commanded, 
nor crushed, nor tormented, nor slain [...]. This is what the Noble Ones say.” [...] We ask 
[the other teachers] severally: “You debaters, is pain pleasant to you or unpleasant?” and if 
he has well understood [this matter], he will answer: “For all living beings [...], pain is 
unpleasant, [...] a great [cause of] fear.” (ƖyƗra۪ga I.4.2.5–6.) 
In texts such as these, violence, harm to other living creatures, is clearly being 
prohibited on the grounds that a person who is keenly aware that other creatures 
experience pain and suffering in the same way and to the same degree as oneself, 
will not be able to tolerate inflicting further pain and suffering on them.36 Now 
Prof. Schmithausen sees this attitude as being “truly ethical” (SCHMITHAUSEN, 
2000a: 275). So let us, following his usage, call this the “ethical” motivation for 
non-violence. 
Now, the question of the motivation of ahiۨsƗ relates to a long-standing 
problem in the field of Buddhist ethics, a problem which is clearly more a philo-
sophical than a historical one, and that is whether there is any “truly ethical” 
purport to the injunctions to obey the Five precepts of Buddhism and other lesser 
commandments, and to follow the rules of “right livelihood” of the Eight-Fold 
Noble Path. For in many passages these seem to be viewed instrumentally, as 
means to salvation. The practice of sƯla/ĞƯla, morality, in general, is to be ob-
served in order to prevent the arising of defiled states of mind, such as aversion, 
greed, and confusion, which in turn prevent one from attaining liberation. To 
attain liberation one must be cleansed of all such defilements, which cloud the 
mind so that it is unable to achieve insight into the nature of reality as expressed 
in the Four Noble Truths or the formula of “three marks.” The cultivation of the 
“divine abidings” (brahmavihƗra), meanwhile – loving kindness, compassion, 
sympathetic joy, and equanimity – are chiefly meditative practices engaged in 
for attaining “liberation of the mind” (cetovimutti) or even “companionship with 
BrahmƗ” (brahmasahavyatƗ). A “truly ethical” attitude, on the other hand – 
which is usually understood to be one that appears to advocate carrying out or 
36  This attitude is already reflected in some texts that draw attention to the consequences of 
violence. Schmithausen, discussing ƖyƗr. 2, 13–15, writes: “The predominant motive seems 
to be disgust with or even dismay at the ubiquity of pain and suffering in this world where 
beings, though unhappy themselves, torture one another, not knowing that they perpetuate 
their own misfortune because their violent acts entail, after death, rebirth in forms of 
existence the vast majority of which is undesirable” (2000a: 263). A bit later he writes, 
“Horror of perpetuating mutual killing in the world would seem to be the motive for ahiۨsƗ 
also at ƖyƗr. I.6.1.2–4” (SCHMITHAUSEN, 2000a: 264). 
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refraining from certain actions simply because they are right or wrong – be-
comes evident, some scholars believe, in such texts as the ones quoted above, 
which appear to preach non-violence without regard to any personal or soterio-
logical benefit but simply as something that is required by the principle of 
reciprocity. 
The insight that Prof. Schmithausen offers us in this essay is this. The 
ritualistic or prudential motivation for the observance of non-violence, which is 
rooted in fear of retaliation, should actually be seen as compatible with the 
ethical one that relates to empathy. 
What I should, however, like to point out is that in spite of all the difference between the 
two motivations a close analysis of the former may show that they are after all not entirely 
incompatible but may, ultimately, derive from a common background. In a sense, the idea 
implied in the Bh৚gu story that the victims will try to take revenge upon the eater or killer in 
the yonder world (or, for that matter, that congeners37 may do so even in this world) in-
controvertibly presupposes the idea that the victims (or the congeners) react – emotionally 
and actually – upon injury inflicted upon them [...] in more or less the same way as one 
would oneself do. Just as one would dislike being injured or killed (or losing one’s rela-
tives), so too the victim (or its congeners). Just as one would long for retaliation, so too the 
victim (or its congeners). Thus, the idea of the victim taking revenge upon the killer in the 
yonder world presupposes at least an inkling of empathy, in the sense of sensing intuitively 
that the feelings of other creatures are basically similar to one’s own feelings. (SCHMIT-
HAUSEN, 2000a: 275.) 
This is the main interpretive conclusion Prof. Schmithausen comes to as a result 
of his analysis of these materials, and it is not insignificant or uninteresting. Fur-
ther reflection, however, will make us aware that this is not the only possible 
interpretation. 
What is being said in the passages cited by Prof. Schmithausen? Why does 
the observation that others experience pain like we do lead to a prohibition of 
inflicting harm on them? (Note that the conclusion that one should not inflict 
violence is not even explicitly stated in the second passage; cf. SCHMITHAUSEN, 
2000a: 273.) It seems that there are actually two possibilities: (1) One recognizes 
that it is wrong to act in a way that one would not want them to act toward 
oneself, in Kantian terms, that inflicting harm or pain on others is a violation of 
the Moral Law.38 (2) Aware of what suffering feels like in one’s own case, one 
37  I.e. animals of the same species. 
38  The principle of morality can of course be formulated in other, e.g. consequentialist, terms. 
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cannot bear to witness others undergoing it, similar to one who cannot bear the 
sight of blood. Just to see others suffer causes oneself to suffer. 
Now, in fact, there is very little evidence in Buddhist literature that hiۨsƗ is 
recognized as a violation of the Moral Law. We encounter a number of state-
ments to the effect that one should not commit violence, or that the saint is in-
capable of doing so, but I am not aware of any clear, unambiguous statement to 
the effect that it is inherently bad or wrong as opposed to something that merely 
causes a good person considerable discomfort. (Do these two things fall toge-
ther? Perhaps. But I shall try to separate them below.) Conversely, there are 
many statements that say monks ought to act for the welfare, benefit, and happi-
ness of others, but none that declare that it is their duty.39 Indeed, I would 
venture to affirm – as others have also noted40 – that we do not find in Buddhist 
literature any clear articulation of the notion of moral obligation, i.e. the aware-
ness of a law or principle that commands one to act or not act in certain ways, 
which applies universally and necessarily to all rational beings.41 On the other 
39  In early Jainism, the idea that all karma entails causing harm to living beings even precludes 
the idea of acting for the welfare of others. 
40  Most recently, by KEOWN, 2005: 27f. and GOODMAN, 2009: 52. 
41  One may think that this concept was not clearly articulated in Western philosophy until 
Kant, but already in Plato we find well developed the idea that certain actions are just or un-
just in and of themselves. See, e.g. PLATO, 1914: 171 (Crito 49a): “Ought we in no way to 
do wrong intentionally (ekontas adikƝteon einai), or should we do wrong in some ways but 
not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable 
(agathon oute kalon) to do wrong (adikein)?” PLATO, 1914: 173 (Crito 49c): “Well, then, is 
it right to requite evil for evil, as the world says, or is it not right (dikaion)?” 
 Paul Williams, in his striking critique of ĝƗntideva’s argument for what he refers to as the 
“universal thesis,” namely, that “morality requires that if I am to remove my own pain I 
must (moral imperative) act to remove the pains of others without discrimination” (WIL-
LIAMS, 1998: 104), which he sees ĝƗntideva to be developing in the eighth chapter of the 
BodhicaryƗvatƗra, seems to consider the Buddhist injunction to alleviate the suffering of 
others (which clearly implies that one should not inflict suffering on them!) as a moral com-
mandment more or less in the Kantian sense. Williams does not argue for this explicitly. He 
stresses, however, that this “imperative” to help others, which reflects “the disinterested 
nature of morality,” follows “rationally” from the considerations that ĝ. cites: “the centrality 
of the role of rationality in the moral imperative from this Buddhist perspective is made very 
clear [...]” (WILLIAMS, 1998: 104f.). This is reminiscent of Kant’s emphasis on the disinter-
estedness of moral action and his conviction that the Moral Law is an object of Reason. 
What Williams overlooks is that the topic of the eighth chapter of the BodhicaryƗvatƗra is 
the perfection of meditation. The arguments ĝ. advances for the “universal thesis” there are 
intended to erase the boundaries between oneself and others in order to reduce attachment to 
one’s self, in preparation for meditation. Here, as elsewhere, Buddhist morality has a sote-
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hand, there are a number of passages that suggest that empathy, the capacity to 
feel what others feel, is the basis of the belief that one should not do unto others 
as one would not wish them to do unto oneself. (Typically, the Golden Rule in 
these texts is given a negative formulation, though not always.) I believe that this 
is the underlying message of the passages quoted above, but it is more explicit in 
other statements. Consider, as just one example, the following passage from the 
MahƗvibhƗ܈ƗĞƗstra (cited by SCHMITHAUSEN, 2000b:135–136). 
When for the Buddha the great detachment is actualized, all the sentient beings of all the 
worlds could burn up before his eyes like dry brush; he would not perceive it. When he 
actualizes the great compassion, the sight of a single suffering being is enough to cause his 
inconceivably strong and unshakeable body to tremble like a banana leaf in a storm. 
________________________________ 
riological purpose; specifically, it liberates the practitioner from the restrictive type of think-
ing that hinders him/her on the Path. The idea that one should alleviate the suffering of 
others just because that is what one should do, i.e. because it is one’s obligation to do so, 
does not come through. 
 Of course, Williams’ main argument in his essay is that ĝ. ultimately undermines the ethics 
of compassion and “destroys the Bodhisattva path” by maintaining that there are in reality 
no other beings who are suffering and in need of being relieved of suffering – no others 
towards whom compassion could appropriately be directed! But this assumes that the Bodhi-
sattva path is an ethical practice. 
 Finally, one might argue that ahiۨsƗ should be considered a moral imperative simply be-
cause it is one of the precepts, even though the concept of a moral imperative as such is not 
clearly worked out in the Buddhist writings – in the way, say, that the concept of a vidhi, 
injunction, is in Brahminical philosophical texts, as the basis of dharma. This consideration 
carries some weight. However, the exhortation to help, and avoid harming, all sentient be-
ings in such texts as the BodhicaryƗvatƗra, which of course is intended for the bodhisattva, 
clearly pertains to something else: a form of existence that involves, beyond just moral 
goodness, a purification of all defilements that removes one from the realm of form. Actions 
are not being recommended or forbidden there just because of the kinds of actions they are. I 
believe Charles Hallisey gets “Buddhist ethics” right when he writes that what it comes 
down to in the end is that in Buddhism “all sorts of things matter,” in different ways, for dif-
ferent reasons (HALLISEY, 1996: 40). The exhortation to do this or refrain from that need not 
always be seen as a moral imperative in order to have practical importance. Even when an 
action can be seen as a moral imperative, as e.g. what will bring about the greatest good for 
the greatest number of sentient beings (as GOODMAN, 2009 convincingly demonstrates to be 
frequently the case), that is not the ultimate criterion of its value. GARFIELD, 2010 (2011) is 
also trying to work out a “phenomenological” reading of the BodhicaryƗvatƗra that avoids 
identifying it as matching a modern Western ethical theory. 
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And indeed, this idea seems common to the Indian Yoga tradition in general. At 
YogasǌtrabhƗ܈ya 2.15, to mention only one other example, it is said that the 
yogin is sensitive to the painfulness of saۨsƗra, to which others are blind, their 
minds darkened by ignorance: 
Why? Because the wise person is similar to an eye-ball. Just as a cobweb placed on the eye-
ball causes pain through touch, but not when placed on any other part of the body, so these 
sufferings [implicit in both the joys and sorrows of saۨsƗra] torment only the yogin, who is 
similar to an eye-ball, not some other experiencer.42  
It is not uncommon for compassion or empathy to be presented as an intense 
feeling or sensitivity, that is, as what we Westerners would call a passion or a 
state, as opposed to a cognition.43 
But if we were to adopt this interpretation of the Golden Rule in the various 
texts Prof. Schmithausen considers, namely, that they are chiefly if not wholly 
expressions of compassion or empathy, that is, a feeling, and not consciousness 
of a moral law or principle that obligates one not to inflict pain on others, re-
gardless of one’s feelings, then the compatibility of the two motivations for non-
violence that Prof. Schmithausen identifies, the ritualistic and the empathic one, 
could have to do with the fact that the intense discomfort and even mental and 
emotional pain that a compassionate person experiences upon seeing someone 
else suffer was also viewed as a kind of retaliation. It is not uncommon for 
someone who cares about another person to say, “It hurts me to see you suffer-
ing so.” A compassionate person who, God forbid!, inflicts pain on another, as 
can sometimes happen by accident or ill-conceived intention, will immediately 
feel profound discomfort. That discomfort, as well as his sense of guilt, is par-
tially what would deter such a person from inflicting harm on anyone. For it 
would be the instantaneous retaliation, as it were, for his transgression. 
42  ak܈ipƗtrakalpo hi vidvƗn iti. yathor۬atantur ak܈ipƗtre nyastaۊ sparĞena duۊkhayati na 
cƗnye܈u gƗtrƗvayave܈u. evam etƗni duۊkhƗny ak܈ipƗtrakalpaۨ yoginam eva kliĞnanti 
netaraۨ pratipattƗram. YSBh 213–214. 
43  Cf. the definitions of compassion, etc., in the commentarial literature. Compassion is like the 
feeling that arises in a mother when she sees her child suffering; sympathetic joy is the glad-
ness a mother experiences when her child is happy (SHAW, 2006: 165). However, it should 
be kept in mind that equanimity, which is to be cultivated along with loving kindness, com-
passion, and sympathetic joy, can temper and even eliminate the emotional effect of the 
other three. Ideally, one should feel compassion dispassionately. See MAITHRIMURTHI, 1999: 
145–149 and the literature he cites. 
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Yet is there not a larger philosophical question that at some point needs to 
be addressed when discussing concepts like nonviolence, empathy, compassion, 
sympathy (anukampƗ), concern, and friendliness in Buddhist literature? Namely, 
What exactly is “the ethical”? Suppose we were to decide that the seed of em-
pathy is already to be seen in texts that reflect the ritualistic motivation? Would 
that mean that there is a kind of incipient ethical thinking in those texts? Prof. 
Schmithausen seems to think so. It is, however, by no means obvious that em-
pathy or compassion and the ethical are to be equated. I may recognize that by 
doing a certain action I would cause great suffering to another person. Feeling 
sorry for him, that recognition might be sufficient to prevent me from carrying 
out the act. But does that mean that I recognize that it is wrong (however we are 
to analyze that concept)? Is it ethical consciousness that prevents me, or indeed 
simply an inability to witness others in pain – a kind of squeamishness, if you 
will? On the other hand, could I know that something is wrong to do even 
though I feel no empathy with the person who will suffer from it? 
Be all that as it may, the idea that compassion is the fundamental principle 
of morality is definitely a minority view among ethical theorists today. Scho-
penhauer argued for it forcefully in his essay of 1840 – though I consider his 
view in certain respects different from the attitude expressed in the Buddhist 
texts I have cited 44 – but it has not been defended much since then. And of 
course there are trenchant critiques of pity and compassion as virtues in modern 
Western philosophy, especially in Spinoza and Nietzsche.45 Even in certain In-
44  Schopenhauer, in his The Foundation of Ethics, argues that one’s action has moral worth 
only when it is motivated by the “weal or woe” of another person. This does not by itself 
imply that one must feel pity or empathy with another, yet Schopenhauer immediately draws 
that implication: “Obviously only through that other man’s becoming the ultimate object of 
my will in the same way as I myself otherwise am and hence through my directly desiring 
his weal and not his woe just as immediately as I ordinarily do only my own. But this neces-
sarily presupposes that, in the case of his woe as such, I suffer directly with him. I feel his 
woe just as I ordinarily feel only my own; and, likewise, I directly desire his weal in the 
same way I otherwise desire only my own” (SCHOPENHAUER, 1994: 204). He goes on in the 
same passage to introduce compassion as “the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine 
loving-kindness” (loc. cit.). 
45  One should not neglect the role sympathy and empathy, “the social feelings of mankind,” 
play in sanctioning the principle of utility in Mill’s utilitarianism; see MILL, 1966: 188–191 
(Utilitarianism, Chap. 3). That means, however, that sympathy toward others itself is not a 
moral obligation but one of the motives for carrying out our moral obligations, as deter-
mined by the principle of utility. For Mill, as for Kant, the principle of morality is an object 
of cognition, an assertion that admits of “proof,” not a feeling. 
 ENGAGING PHILOSOPHICALLY WITH INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS 157 
AS/EA LXVII•1•2013, S. 125–163 
dian texts, especially in epic literature, pity and compassion are sometimes seen 
as problematic. In the Bhagavad GƯtƗ K৚ৢ৆a admonishes Arjuna, when the latter 
is “filled with pity (k܀payƗvi܈ܒa)” for his kinsmen, whom he must slay in a right-
eous war, 
Where does this weakness in you come from, Arjuna, at this time of crisis? It is not fitting in 
a nobleman. It does not gain you heaven. It does not bring you any honour. 
Don’t give in to this impotence! It doesn’t belong in you! Give up this petty weakness, this 
faintness of heart. You are a world conqueror, Arjuna. Stand up!46,47 
46  BhGƯ II.2–3, THOMPSON, 2008: 8. kutas tvƗ kaĞmalam idaۨ vi܈ame samupasthitam / 
anƗryaju܈ܒam asvargyam akƯrtitam arjuna // klaibyaۨ mƗ sma gamaۊ pƗrtha naitat tvayy 
upapadyate / k܈udraۨ h܀dayadaurbalyaۨ tyaktvotti܈ܒha parantapa //. 
47  And of course we cannot neglect to mention the MƯmƗূsƗ rejection of ahiۨsƗ as a moral 
imperative; see HALBFASS, 1983:1–26. In the context of our discussion, Halbfass’ summary 
of KumƗrila’s defense of the permissibility of blood sacrifice in the CodanƗsǌtra chapter of 
his ĝlokavƗrttika bears quotation at length. 
 “KumƗrila rejects the idea of a universal cosmic causality, a general law of retribution which 
would cause the pain or injury inflicted upon a living creature to fall back upon its origina-
tor. This magico-ritualistic notion of cosmic retribution, which is based upon the presupposi-
tion of universal balance and reciprocity, is obsolete for KumƗrila. He tries to give a ‘ratio-
nal’ refutation of such a notion, which seems to play a considerable role in the texts quoted 
by Schmidt, which has been preserved and developed in the traditions of SƗূkhya and 
Yoga, and which, closer to KumƗrila’s own time, is well documented in VyƗsa’s BhƗ܈ya on 
Patañjali’s Yogasǌtra. There is not only no scriptural, but also no perceptual or inferential 
evidence for the idea that somebody who causes pain or injury during a sacrificial perfor-
mance is liable to a corresponding retributive suffering. Trying to infer suffering for the 
actor (kartur duۊkhƗnumƗnam) from the fact that the sacrificial victim has to suffer 
(hiۨsyamƗnasya duۊkhitvam) is nothing but a logical fallacy, based upon false analogies. 
 If reciprocity were indeed the foundation of dharma and adharma, of reward and punish-
ment, how could this apply to such obvious, though ‘victimless’, violations of norms such as 
illicit drinking? And if benevolence and the production of well-being or pleasure were 
dharma, would a sexual act with the wife of one’s guru, a ‘mortal sin’ (mahƗpƗtaka) accord-
ing to the dharmaĞƗstra rules, not be an act of dharma? One should leave aside the criteria 
of pleasure and pain in trying to determine what is right and wrong in the sense of dharma 
and adharma. The only source which can teach us about dharma and adharma are the 
injunctions and prohibitions (vidhi, prati܈edha) of the Vedic ‘revelation’. They are specified 
according to the occasion of the act and the qualification of the actor, and they cannot be 
translated into or reduced to general, commonsensically ‘reasonable’ rules and principles 
concerning pleasure and pain, violence and non-violence (HALBFASS, 1983: 3–4).” 
 The point I am trying to make can be put this way: Compassion would appear not to have 
ethical significance if it is a mere feeling. If, on the other hand, it does have ethical signifi-
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The main point I wish to make here, however, is the following: At a certain point 
it becomes appropriate and even necessary to ask about the philosophical value 
of the teaching of ahiۨsƗ. Is it really what we would call an ethical idea? Does it 
hold out any promise of advancing our understanding of what the ethical 
consists in, and do the Indian texts provide that? Is it just the product of a kind of 
pre- or proto-ethical thinking that has little relevance for us? Or, indeed, does it 
really pertain to a different sphere, not to the realm of human relationships, to 
meeting the demands of the “other,” but (as I suspect) to spiritual practice, the 
effort to transcend the human condition altogether?48 After all, it is with India’s 
great traditions of renunciation – Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga – that the teach-
ing of nonviolence is chiefly associated. Merely by suggesting that, in certain 
texts, it is a truly ethical doctrine, even so careful and rigorous a historian as 
Prof. Schmithausen has tentatively set foot onto philosophical terrain.49 Even if 
he would probably not want to venture any farther,50 it seems natural and even 
inevitable that others more philosophically inclined have wanted to do so. 
4 
In this essay I have attempted to offer a justification for the philosophical en-
gagement with Indian philosophical texts. The justification has been two-fold: de 
facto and de jure. The de facto justification attempts to explain, and thus to an 
extent excuse, the Anglophone historian of Indian philosophy for being particu-
larly inclined to reflect critically on Indian materials – more so perhaps than 
scholars in other parts of the world. For his professional training and circum-
________________________________ 
cance, then it seems it would have to be grounded on some deeper principle. What KumƗrila 
appears to be disputing here is that there is any such deeper principle. 
48  If the ethical pertains to the human sphere, and has fundamentally to do with fulfilling one’s 
purpose as a human being among others, then a teaching that urges us to transcend our 
human circumstances may well not be properly ethical. 
49  Richard Gombrich is another historian who makes free use of the term “ethical” in his inter-
pretation of Buddhist ideas. See GOMBRICH, 2009: especially 29–44, where he argues that 
the theory of karma as introduced by the Buddha “ethicized” the already established theory 
of rebirth. 
50  Nevertheless, Prof. Schmithausen’s work on the implications of Buddhist attitudes toward 
nature, e.g. SCHMITHAUSEN, 1991, is itself deeply philosophical in that it attempts to sketch 
an environmental ethics consistent with Buddhist principles. On every page, Prof. Schmit-
hausen’s acute sensitivity to the suffering of the environment and living beings is evident. 
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stances in part determine him/her to be so inclined. We should therefore be 
tolerant of him, humour him, if you will, and listen to what he has to say and try 
to understand why he is so excited, why he thinks he has stumbled onto a gold 
mine of philosophical theories and arguments in these texts! But there is a de 
jure justification as well: one has a right to, and certain individuals, at least (not 
necessarily everyone, of course – there can be an appropriate division of labour) 
ought to engage philosophically with Indian philosophical texts, because it 
yields certain benefits. Not only is it essential to understanding those texts in 
their historical context, as works of philosophy. It complements our quest for 
historical truth with reflection on the great questions of reality and human 
existence which Indian texts, just as much as those of our own tradition, 
certainly pose. To justify the philosophical engagement with these texts, of 
course, is not to declare that it is always appropriate or acceptable. Like any 
other practice, it can be done well or poorly. And as for any other methodology 
of knowledge, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Only if, over time, we 
feel that it advances our understanding of these materials, yields insights that 
seem to disclose aspects of the true nature of Indian philosophical thought, will 
it find acceptance as a bona fide practice of knowledge, as indeed philosophical 
engagement with historical materials has become an accepted part of the study 
of the history of Western philosophy. 
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